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Abstract— Tor, originally known as The Onion Router, is a
free software that allows users to communicate anonymously on
the Internet. This makes Tor attractive to cyber criminals, and
the anonymity provided can be misused by hackers to enable
remote control of victim systems. Indeed, a large volume of
Tor traffic is used for malicious purposes such as fast port
scans, hacking attempts, ex-filtration of stolen credentials, etc.
This makes Tor traffic detection an important component of
intrusion detection and prevention systems. Hence, in this paper
we present a deep neural network (DNN) based system for the
detection and classification of encrypted Tor traffic. The system
achieved 99.89% accuracy in the classification of Tor and non-
Tor traffic on the UNB-CIC Tor network dataset. Experiments
conducted for classifying Tor traffic types demonstrated an
accuracy of 95.6%, which is 6.2% higher than previous work on
the same dataset. Additionally, the robustness of the proposed
DNN classifier is evaluated using adversarial samples generated
from a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). We observed
that 100% of the adversarial examples were unidentified by
the DNN classifiers. Further retraining of the DNN classifiers
with adversarial examples eventually improved their robustness
against the adversarial attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the present era of fast-paced Internet omnipresence and
connectivity, any information needed by end-users is readily
available in mere seconds. This ease of access to the Internet
raises concerns regarding the release of sensitive data and
individual browsing behaviour without the permission of
users. Nowadays, it is quite common for organizations to
closely monitor inbound/outbound network traffic to detect
patterns indicative of anomalous behaviour. Thus, traffic
analysis and classification has emerged as an active re-
search area over the last few years. Traffic classification has
found widespread application in preventing cyber-attacks [1],
optimizing the underlying network [2], relocating network
resources for prioritized users, understanding types of transit
traffic [3], diagnostics monitoring, network management, etc.
Traditional traffic classification methods use knowledge of
packet headers for determining suspicious behaviour. This
approach based on signature matching is inefficient, as it
is incapable of identifying new instances. Hence, there is a
need to develop more efficient and more effective methods
of performing traffic analysis.
Currently, organizations are keen on adopting security
solutions capable of preserving the privacy of user data.
Commonly adopted methods include the use of dynamic
port numbers and data encryption before leaving the secured
network. Tor browser [4] is a popular application used
to provide anonymity to its users. Tor permits users to
circumvent internet censorship by routing data over relay
servers acting as proxies. Initially, a user browses the web
by anonymously sending a request to the directory of Tor
servers. After establishing a connection, data is passed to
the first server also known as an entry guard. The request is
then forwarded to a one-hop server that uses session keys of
the previous server. Eventually, the last hop relays data to
the destination. Anonymity is thus ensured by hiding the IP
addresses, incorporating three routers, and session keys.
While Tor allows anonymous communication over the
Internet, it is also prone to abuse by activists, hackers and
cybercriminals. Tor is increasingly used for illegal activities
such as sharing copyrighted materials, selling weapons, shar-
ing pornography etc. Furthermore, attackers may employ the
Tor service to run command and control (C&C) infrastructure
to communicate with botnets.
Intelligent systems employing machine learning ap-
proaches have been developed to perform accurate clas-
sification of network traffic [5], [6]. Such solutions bal-
ance the trade-off between computational complexity and
classification accuracy quite successfully, with a majority
of frameworks using shallow architectures [7]. With the
explosion of bulk internet traffic, the number of packets
required to be analyzed is continually increasing. Thus, it is
infeasible for a network administrator to analyze all of them.
Consequently, the performance of traditional classification
algorithms is far from satisfactory when deployed on large
scale training samples and features.
The last few years have witnessed the evolution of deep
learning architectures [8], [9] especially in domains such as
computer vision [10] and text analytics [11]. These architec-
tures have multiple layers consisting of non-linear processing
units, and can appropriately identify relevant attributes from
a large set of training examples to infer meaningful patterns.
Hence, these networks have been successfully leveraged for
traffic classification [12], [13] phishing detection [14], [15]
and botnet detection [16].
In this paper, we present an effective method to differ-
entiate between Tor and non-Tor traffic using deep neural
networks. Additionally, we show that it is possible to detect
the traffic type from the encrypted flows, thus allowing the
network owner (for example an ISP) to block specific content
transmitted over the Tor network. In order to evaluate the
robustness of the developed deep neural network models, we
implemented a traffic generator using Generative Adversarial
Network[17]. In particular, we use the trained generator to
create malicious traffic with a statistical distribution identical
to legitimate ones to fool the previously trained machine
learning models. The trained models failed to detect any of
the adversarial examples despite being able to classify Tor
and non-Tor traffic with very high accuracy. In summary, the
key contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We present an approach for classifying Tor and non-
Tor flows, and identifying the Tor traffic type using
deep neural networks (DNN). We perform experiments
to evaluate the DNN models and compare their perfor-
mance to previous models evaluated on the same dataset
(UNB-CIC Tor network dataset).
• We show that DNN exhibited better accuracy (99.89%)
than the previous models. Furthermore, in classifying
Tor network traffic into respective types, the perfor-
mance of DNN exceeds that of previous work by 6.2%.
• Finally, we evaluate the robustness of the DNN models
on adversarial examples generated with a Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) model. Using the synthetic
adversarial examples, we show that the DNN models
initially fail to predict the packets generated by the
GAN. However, on further retraining, the accuracy of
predicting the adversarial examples improves.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
provides a brief introduction to the Tor network and discusses
related work. Section III presents the methodology, while
Section IV discusses the experiments. In Section V the GAN
model architecture is described; while in Section VI results
from different DNN architectures are presented and com-
pared to results from related works. Section VII describes
the adversarial attack on the models. Finally, Section VIII
presents conclusion and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Tor
The Tor network provides anonymity by bouncing traffic
over a chain of intermediate computers. Generally, traffic is
relayed through three types of nodes (a) entry/guard relay,
(b) middle relay, and (c) exit relay (see Figure 1). Each of
these relay nodes has specific roles:
• Entry/Guard relay: as the name indicates, this is the
entry point of a Tor network and is selected from a
directory server (collection of onion routers).
• Middle relay: are the intermediate relay nodes present
between the guard and exit nodes. It acts as shield to
prevent the entry and exit nodes from knowing each
other.
• Exit relay: are the exit point of the Tor network. The exit
relay node transmits data to the intended destination.
Tor minimizes the risk of traffic analysis by distributing
communication over diverse places on the internet. Instead
of considering a static route between the source and the
destination, the Tor network randomly chooses a pathway so
that no interceptors can reveal where the packets originated
and where they are destined for. Tor incrementally constructs
a private path by developing an encrypted circuit. This circuit
is progressively created one hop at a time with each relay
node only aware of where the data was received and to which
node the data is to be forwarded. Moreover, each pair of
communication is encrypted with separate Diffie Hellman









NOT ENCRYPTED BY TOR
Fig. 1. A basic architecture of the Tor network
B. Related Work
Analysis of Tor traffic has been an active area of research
in the last couple of years. Previous works such as [22],
[23], [28], [2] are based on analysis of Tor Traffic within
a Tor node. By contrast, [27] and [21] address the problem
of characterizing Tor traffic through observing the encrypted
network traffic between the client and entry node. In [21],
the authors focused on detecting Tor from non-Tor traffic and
identifying the Tor traffic type using 23 time-based features.
The exclusive use of time-related features was to expedite
efficiency and to ensure an encryption independent traffic
classifier. We adopt a similar approach in this paper and
base our experiments on their published dataset from real
Tor and non-Tor traffic. However, different from [21] where
traditional machine learning techniques such as ZeroR, C.45
and KNN were utilized, our classification and identification
approaches are based on deep neural networks. Furthermore,
we have analyzed the robustness of our approach to adversar-
ial attacks using a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN).
In [20], the authors develop a machine learning approach
for detecting non-Tor traffic in a network (implemented for
an Intrusion Detection System), using the dataset generated
in [21]. They propose two classifiers, one based on Artificial
Neural Network (ANN) and another on Support Vector
Machine (SVM). Moreover, they present a feature selection
algorithm that allows them to select the most important
features from the total number of features in the dataset.
Finally, they show that an almost perfect detection accuracy
of non-Tor traffic is indeed achievable.
In [1], the authors propose a system to detect and block Tor
traffic in a network using deep packet inspection (DPI). In
the technique presented, Tor traffic characteristics is obtained
from deep packet inspection of the three-way handshake
packets exchanged at the connection establishment stage (i.e.
TLS handshake process). Within the process, some signatures
are extracted that distinguish the TLS handshake of Tor
browser from the TLS handshake of ordinary browsers.
These signatures are then used to detect Tor-bound traffic
using Bro-IDS. Once Tor traffic is detected, the destination
IP of the detected packet is logged and a proxy will use
this information to block traffic to that destination. Unlike
[1], our approach uses time-based features rather than DPI
to detect Tor traffic. Moreover, unlike our study, the authors
of [1] did not extend their work to detection of Tor Traffic
types. It is also important to note that DPI cannot be applied
to encrypted traffic.
In [24], the feasibility and effectiveness of attacks against
Tor using NetFlow data was investigated. An active traffic
analysis technique based on perturbation of the user traffic
characteristic at the server side, while observing a similar
perturbation at the client side through statistical correlation
was applied. The method yielded 100% accuracy in revealing
the actual source of anonymous traffic from in-lab testing.
However, with real-world experiments an overall accuracy
of 81.6% and false positive of 5.5% was achieved. Different
from [24], our goal in this paper is classification of Tor
traffic rather than de-anonymization. Also, our study is based
on passive traffic analysis rather than active analysis that
requires eavesdropping in real-time.
In [25], the authors used a simulated network to detect
Tor traffic based on the use of packet sizes as features.
They captured data in the form of 1MB capture files and
recombined them with mergecap and then processed the files
with NetAI to produce ARFF format files for use by the
Weka machine learning environment. Random Forest, J48
and Adaboost algorithms were used to classify HTTPS and
HTTP over Tor traffic. Random forest was ble to classify
HTTP over Tor with 93.7% accuracy and a false positive of
3.7%, but classified HTTPS over Tor with 97.7% accuracy
and 0.3% false positive. By contrast, our work classifies Tor
traffic into 8 different types whilst also identifying Tor traffic
from non-Tor traffic with high accuracy using deep learning
models.
In [27], the authors used a Hidden Markov Model to
separate encrypted Tor traffic into four different application
types (P2P, FTP, IM and Web, while anything else is classed
as unknown), thus detecting the type of encrypted traffic with
a maximum accuracy of 92%. As features, they use burst
volumes and directions extracted from Tor flows in contrast
to time-based features used in this paper.
The study in this paper, unlike the aforementioned pre-
vious works develops DNN models for classifying Tor and
non-Tor traffic, as well as identifying the traffic type from
the encrypted Tor flows. Furthermore, unlike previous works,
we test the robustness of the DNN models against adversarial
examples of Tor traffic generated using GAN.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methodology employed for
traffic classification in this paper. Here, we discuss the
dataset, feature selection methods, classification algorithms,
and evaluation metrics. Finally, we present the methods used
to generate adversarial samples using Generative Adversarial
Network.
A. Dataset Description
In order to build our machine learning models, we used
the UNB-CIC Tor and non-Tor real-world dataset [21]. This
dataset was generated by setting up three users to initiate
activities using the Tor network and storing the packets in
.pcap files. The traffic was collected using Wireshark and
tcpdump resulting in a 22GB dataset consisting of 8,044
samples labelled as TOR while 59,784 were labelled as non-
TOR. Further processing produced 28 features summarized
in Table I. These features were generated by grouping
packets by {sourceIP, sourcePort, destIP, destPort, protocol}.
Two .csv files were produced with the generated features. In
the first file, the features were labeled as Tor and combined
with ones derived from normal traffic [26], labeled as non-
Tor.). In the second file, the dataset includes eight types of
Tor traffic generated for diverse applications (see Table II).
TABLE I
ATTRIBUTES EXTRACTED FROM NETWORK FLOW
Source IP IP address sending the packets
Source port Port used by the source
Destination IP IP address receiving the packets
Destination port Port used by the destination
Protocol Protocol used for communication
Flow duration Length of the connection (seconds)
Flow bytes Number of bytes sent
Flow packets Number of packets sent
Flow IAT Packets flow inter arrival time
(max, min, mean, std)
Fwd IAT Forward inter arrival time (max,
min, mean, std)
Bwd IAT Backward inter arrival time (max,
min, mean, std)
Active Seconds in which the flow has been
active (max, min, mean, std)
Idle Seconds in which the flow has been
idle (max, min, mean, std)
B. Feature Selection
In the preprocessing phase of machine learning (ML)
pipeline, we use feature selection methods to eliminate
irrelevant attributes. Typically, feature selection algorithms
are broadly categorized into three groups (a) filter, (b) wrap-
per, and (c) hybrid approaches. Filter methods use intrinsic
properties of attributes (i.e., distance, entropy, dependency or
consistency) to determine if the subset of attributes represent
the characteristics of observations. Wrapper approaches use
accuracies of ML algorithms to evaluate the importance
of selected features. However, the outcome of the selected
subset of attributes is always biased towards the ML algo-
rithm of choice. Hybrid methods combine the benefits of
wrapper and filter methods to select an optimal subset of
attributes. In this study, we use Correlation Based Filter
Selection (CFS) [31] and Symmetric Uncertainty (SU) [31],
two well-known feature selection methods to obtain the
TABLE II
DESCRIPTION OF TOR NETWORK TRAFFIC
Traffic Type Description
Web browsing HTTPS and HTTP traffic generated with
Firefox and Chrome
Email Mails were delivered through SMTPS and
received using POP3S and IMAPS
Chat Traffic samples were generated using in-
stant messaging applications like Facebook,
Hangouts, Skype, ICQ and AIM
Streaming Youtube and Vimeo services were used to
generate continuous streams of data.
File Transfer The traffic was generated using services
like FTP over SSH (SFTP), FTP over
SSL (FTPS) and Skype.
VoIP Voice traffic generated using Facebook,
Skype and Hangouts.
P2P Traffic generated from Torrent i.e., µtorrent
and Bittorrent
optimal feature set. Before feature selection, we preprocess
the dataset. In particular, we remove irrelevant attributes like
sourceIP, destIP and protocol which were too specific for
training a generic neural network. Moreover, we eliminated
the rows consisting of NaN for all the attributes. In the
following paragraphs, we introduce the feature selection
methods used in our experiment.
1) Symmetric Uncertainty (SU) Symmetric Uncertainty
is based on the concept of information theory i.e., en-
tropy which measures the uncertainty/unpredictability
of a random variable. The entropy of a variable X is




P (x) log2(P (x)), (1)
Now, if the entropy of X is partitioned with respect
to another variable Y , then the entropy of X after
observing Y is defined using Equation 2.






P (x|y) log2(P (x|y)),
(2)
Here, P (x) and P (x|y) are prior and posterior prob-
abilities respectively. The decrease in the entropy of
X with respect to Y gives additional information, and
this is known as information gain defined as
IG(X|Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ), (3)
It is important to note that information gain is biased
towards attributes with larger values, and does not
produce normalized values by which attributes can be
compared. Thus, we used symmetric uncertainty (SU)
to determine relevant features which can be defined by
Equation 4.






SU, removes the bias introduced by information
gain and produces values in the range of [0,1].
Here, a value of 1 indicates that the knowledge
of one attribute can predict the importance of
the other attribute, and a value of 0 indicates
the independence of attributes X and Y .
Eventually, eleven features i.e., ’source port’,
’dest port’, ’flow dur’, ’flow iat std’,
’flow iat min’,’fwd iat mean’,
’fwd iat std’, ’bwd iat mean’,’bwd iat std’,
’bwd iat max’, ’bwd iat min’ are retained by
applying symmetric uncertainty.
2) Correlation Based Filter Selection (CFS): A feature
is considered important if it is relevant to a class and
redundant to other features of the same class. In other
words, relevance is the indication of the predictive
power of an attribute for identifying examples of a
class. Normally, relevance is determined by either
estimating linear correlation or entropy. Finally, from
the application of CFS with a fixed threshold, four
attributes (i.e.,’source port’, ’dest port’,
’bwd iat mean’, ’bwd iat std’) yielding
high accuracy were obtained. CFS utilizes symmetric
uncertainty for estimating the relevance of an attribute.
Features are selected using a two step approach. In
the first step, symmetric uncertainty (SUi,C > δ)
of feature fi ∈ F with class C for a threshold δ is
estimated. Subsequently, a list of attributes, arranged
in descending order of symmetric uncertainty value is
created. In the next phase, the goal is to identify set
of prominent attributes (F
′ ⊂ F ) such that there exist
no attribute j such that SUj,C > SUi,C .
C. Machine Learning Models
In this paper, deep neural network models of various
configurations were implemented and trained using 25 fea-
tures out of the 28 (i.e. excluding sourceIP, destIP and
protocol) described in Table I. A deep neural network
consists of multiple layers stacked to form a more in-depth
architecture [30]. An artificial neural network tries to learn
the mapping between the features (given as input) and the
labels (given as output). Typically, the neurons (non-linear
units) are responsible for mapping the input to the output.
Each neuron in the first layer takes its input from the feature
vector and computes an output value that gets transferred to
the next layer.
In the training phase, the weights in each neuron are ad-
justed using backpropagation and gradient descent algorithm
to minimize error. The main difference between a classic
artificial neural network and a deep neural network is the
depth. In the latter, multiple hidden layers are present, thus
increasing the performance of the model. Moreover, it is
usually harder to train deep neural networks as fast as classic
ones, so in recent years, much research has been focused on
improving training times [19].
D. Evaluation Metrics
In this study, we evaluate the performance of the models
using the following well-known metrics: Precision, Recall,
F-measure, Accuracy and Area Under Receiver Operating
Characteristic Curve (AUC-ROC). The performance mea-
sures are shown in Table III. These metrics help us to validate
the performance of the model on new/unseen data.
TABLE III
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Harmonic mean of re-
call (R) and precision (P).





ROC-AUC ROC compares TPR (Re-
call) vs False Positive
Rate (FPR), and AUC is
the area underneath the
entire ROC curve, with
unity being the highest
possible value.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULT ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the results of our experiments
and demonstrate the effectiveness of our classification model.
All experiments were performed using a system installed
with Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS operating system, Intel core i7
consisting of 16GB RAM. The DNN model implementation
was carried out using the Keras library running a Tensorflow
backend. Tensorflow supports both CPU and GPU device
types. We particularly configured the system using GPU
support for accelerating the training process.
We considered four scenarios in the experiments based on
the network traffic dataset collected from [21]. The dataset
is explained in detail in Section III-A. Besides, we created
a classification model using network topologies shown in
Table IV. Experiments, along with the goals, are described
below:
• Scenario I: Identification of Tor and non-Tor traffic
utilizing the DNN models. The goal is to identify
whether or not a given TCP flow is transmitting Tor
traffic.
• Scenario II: Performance evaluation of classification
model to label a traffic into a specific category (i.e.
browsing, email, chat, audio, video, file transfer, p2p
and VoIP). The goal is to identify the type of traffic
flow existing within an encrypted Tor session.
• Scenario III: We compare the accuracy of shallow
network and the deep neural network.
• Scenario IV: Finally, we also evaluate the robustness
of the classification model using an adversarial attack.
In particular, we generate instances using Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN). Subsequently, we assess
whether the trained classifiers could identify the traffic
generated with GAN.
A. Scenario I: Tor vs non-Tor
In this experiment, the DNN-A and DNN-B models (refer
to Table IV) were trained using Tor and non-Tor traffic. To
train the models, we used 70% of the traffic. Out of the
remaining samples, 10% was used for validating the model
while 20% was used as the test set. Primarily, the focus
of this experiment was to investigate the capability of the
classifiers to label traffic as Tor or non-Tor. Specifically,
this scenario can be considered to be a binary classification
task. To avoid over-fitting, we continuously retrained the
classification model until the accuracy on the validation
set improved. Table V summarizes the performance in the
binary classification task. We observe that improved outcome
is obtained with DNN-B with five layers, trained on 25
attributes (i.e. excluding sourceIP, destIP and protocol from
the original 28 features outlined in Table I). DNN-B had
an overall accuracy of 99.89%, while that of DNN-A was
98.81%.
B. Scenario II: Multiclass classification
In this experiment, given a TCP flow already recognized
as Tor traffic (as in Experiment I), we intend to classify
an unseen/new traffic into one of eight classes (browsing,
email, chat, audio, video, file transfer, VoIP, p2p). As the
scenario mentioned above depicts, in the case of multi-class
classification we employed DNN-C, having eight neurons in
the output layer. The evaluation was performed in a similar
manner to the first scenario, splitting the dataset into three
subsets: training set (75%), validation set (10%) and test set
(15%). An F-measure of 0.95 along-with 95.60% accuracy
is obtained with DNN-C for this experiment (see Table VI).
C. Scenario III: Evaluation on Synthetic Traffic Test Set
In this section, we perform a further evaluation of the
DNN models using a separate batch of new test traffic to
emulate an unknown traffic classification scenario. To obtain
new test traffic, we used the Shadow network simulator with
Tor plug-in [29] to generate new .pcap files; these were then
processed in the same way as the original ones used for
the dataset. Although Shadow simulates the network layer,
it links to and runs real Tor software. Thus, Shadow allows
us to run a private Tor network on a single machine.
Table VII shows the performance of the models on the
test set derived from the Tor traffic generated using Shadow.
Both DNN models can be seen to have performed quite
well on the new test set. However it can be observed that
the performance obtained with DNN-B is better than DNN-
A. The overall accuracy for DNN-A is 97.13%, while that
of DNN-B is 99.47%. The results are consistent with those
obtained in experiment 1 (shown in Table V). Both sets of
results show that the deeper the network, as in the case
of DNN-B, the better the outcome of the classification.
Deeper networks learn discriminant patterns to effectively
differentiate observations of distinct classes.
TABLE IV
ARCHITECTURE OF THE PROPOSED MODELS
Architecture name Number of layers Neurons Activations
DNN-A 3 [50, 25, 1] [ReLu, ReLu, Sigmoid]
DNN-B 5 [200, 100, 50, 25, 1] [ReLu, ReLu, ReLu, ReLu, Sigmoid]
DNN-C 4 [25, 50, 100, 8] [Leaky ReLu, Leaky ReLu, Leaky ReLu, Softmax]
GAN generator 4 [25, 50, 100, 25] [Leaky ReLu, Leaky ReLu, Leaky ReLu, Tanh]
GAN discriminator 4 [100, 50, 25, 1] [Leaky ReLu, Leaky ReLu, Leaky ReLu, Sigmoid]
TABLE V
RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT 1: CLASSIFYING TRAFFIC INTO TOR AND
NON-TOR USING 25 FEATURES
Metrics DNN (A) DNN (B)
Precision (Tor) 99.15% 99.88%
Recall (Tor) 99.50% 99.99%
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RESULTS OF EVALUATING TRAINED MODELS ON A TEST SET OF
SYNTHETIC TRAFFIC
Metrics DNN (A) DNN (B)
Precision (Tor) 96.84% 98.63%
Recall (Tor) 98.20% 99.83%
F-Measure (Tor) 0.97 0.99
Accuracy 97.13% 99.47%
ROC-AUC 0.97 0.99
V. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORK
We implemented the Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) by combining the ideas behind all
three previous models. The resulting architecture was then
simplified since the training process for a GAN is longer
and more difficult to stabilize than a standard deep neural
network. Therefore, using a simpler model accelerated the
experimentation. The model architecture is shown in Figure
2. Note that this architecture was only implemented for the
Tor/non-Tor dataset and is not directly applicable to the
multi-class problem (i.e. traffic classification).
A Generative Adversarial Network[17] (GAN for short)
is a special architecture deriving from the more classic deep
neural network. In this setup, two neural networks are trained
in a round-robin style. The two networks are called generator
and discriminator, with the following duties:
• Generator: takes a random noise as input and tries to
learn the probability distribution of the underlying data
P (x|y), generating fake samples that get passed to the
discriminator and should fool it into predicting that
these examples are real.
• Discriminator: takes as input both real and fake samples,
originating from the dataset and the generator respec-
tively. It aims to determine whether the given example
is real or fake, and thus learn which values for which
features make up a real sample or a fake one.
This approach is based on game theory, and from experimen-
tal results in different contexts, the trained model is usually
more robust to external manipulation and less prone to over-
fitting [18].
Generator












Fig. 2. Generative Adversarial Network for identifying network traffic
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In this Section, we compare the performance of our
method with prior research work [20] and [21] that utilized
the same dataset used in our experiments. Primarily, we
compared the results for both binary classification problem
and traffic type classification. The results of the ANN exper-
iments are presented in Table VIII, while direct comparison
with related works (namely [20] and [21]) are given in
Table IX.
In particular, we implemented three ANN models which
were reported in previous work. The first one is trained
on 25 features, while the second (ANN-CFS) and third
(ANN-SU) are trained on the dataset after applying the
CFS and SU feature selection methods respectively. From
our experiments, ANN had 98.09% accuracy and F-measure
of 0.98, which outperformed the other two models (see
Table VIII). These results show that both DNN-A and DNN-
B models performed better than all three ANN models that
we implemented.
Finally, we compare the best results obtained in our
experiments with the best results from previous works [20]
and [21] in Table IX. Note that these papers used the same
dataset that we experimented with in this paper. From the
tabulated results, we observe that the proposed model (DNN-
B) outperforms the artificial neural network (ANN-CFS) in
identifying Tor traffic. Furthermore, in classifying Tor traffic
into respective types, it can be seen that the performance of
our DNN-C model is significantly better than the C4.5 and
ANN-CFS models used in previous work.
TABLE VIII
RESULTS FOR TOR VS NON-TOR ON OUR IMPLEMENTATION OF ANN
MODELS EMPLOYED IN PRIOR WORK.
Metrics ANN ANN-CFS ANN-SU
Precision (Tor) 98.69% 96.18% 97.86%
Recall (Tor) 99.16% 97.83% 98.77%
F-Measure (Tor) 0.98 0.96 0.98
Accuracy 98.09% 94.66% 97.15%
ROC-AUC 0.99 0.96 0.98
TABLE IX
RESULTS COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR DNN MODELS AND THE BEST
RESULTS FROM PREVIOUS WORKS [20] AND[21]
Experiment 1- Tor and non-Tor
Metrics DNN (B) ANN-CFS [20] C4.5 [21]
Precision (Tor) 99.88% 99.8% 94.8%
Recall (Tor) 99.99% 98.8% 93.4%
F-Measure (Tor) 0.99 0.99 -
Accuracy 99.89% 99.80% -
Experiment 2- Traffic Type Classification
DNN (C) ANN-CFS [20] C4.5 [21]
Precision 95.68% 88% 79%
Recall 95.59% 79.4% 79%
F-Measure 0.95 0.84 -
Accuracy 95.60% 89.4% -
VII. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ON THE DEEP NETWORKS
As seen in the previous section, the detection of Tor traffic
in a network is quite accurate, allowing the network owner to
completely block Tor. Moreover, since the proposed models
rely on low-level features of the connections, it is hard to
escape detection. A possible countermeasure to this is to use
the generator part of the Generative Adversarial Network
to forge parameters that are close to those observed with
Tor, so as to fool the detection system into thinking that the
generated flow is non-Tor traffic.
In order to test this hypothesis, the best generator from
all the training epochs was fed random noise to generate
fake parameters. The generated features were then used as
input to the previously discussed trained models and their
responses determined. The results of this process are shown
in Table X. These results show that DNN-B detected only a
fraction of the faked Tor samples, i.e. 1.03%. On the other
hand DNN-A was bypassed by all the adversarial samples,
classifying 100% of them as non-Tor. This experiment also
confirms that a GAN is usually more attack-resistant than
classical DNN, as shown in Table X. These results are based
on 1000 generated fake instances.
TABLE X
PERFORMANCE ON ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Models DNN (A) DNN (B) GAN
% of forged examples 100% 98.97% 73.02%
classified as non-Tor
The results confirm the validity of the formulated hypothe-
sis, as the fake parameters generated initially deceived DNN-
A in all cases and DNN-B in almost all cases. However, as
shown in Figure 3, retraining with the adversarial samples
improved the performance of DNN-B, but DNN-A misclas-
sifies samples even when the retraining steps were increased.
However, beyond 20 epochs, the number of misclassified
instances drops sharply for DNN-B, while at 40 epochs and
beyond, the misclassification of the adversarial samples is re-
duced to nearly zero. On the other hand, for DNN-A, it takes
more than 60 epochs of retraining for the misclassifcation
rate to drop from 100%; the misclassification rate gradually
drops until epoch 120 and beyond where it stabilizes at about
8%. It is therefore quite clear from the figure that DNN-
B (the deeper network) is more resilient to the adversarial
attack than DNN-A.
Fig. 3. Performance improvement of DNN with retraining
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented Deep Neural Network models
for detecting Tor traffic in a network. The models were
investigated using several experimental scenarios. The results
show that it is indeed possible to detect Tor with near-perfect
accuracy using DNN and, moreover, it is also possible to
detect (and thus block) specific categories or types of Tor
traffic with DNN. Additionally, we showed that adversarial
examples of Tor generated using a GAN could bypass
the DNN models that previously detected Tor traffic with
high accuracy. However, further retraining with adversarial
examples proved to be a viable mitigation to the adversarial
attack, indicating that the deeper networks were more robust
to the attack. For future work, other types of deep learning
architectures for Tor traffic detection and classification will
be implemented and evaluated. Their robustness to adversar-
ial attacks will also be investigated.
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